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Reconceptualizing the 2006 QDR Threat Categories
by Dr. Robert J. Bunker
Projections of the future national-

terrorist challenges will not be distinct

original QDR threat categories.

security environment are always

styles — they will all be present in

laden with uncertainty and ambiguity.

some form. This could include states

can think of warfare as transitioning

However, they help to serve an early-

blending high-tech capabilities, such

from the modern to the post-modern

warning function concerning emergent

as anti-satellite weapons, with ter-

era — just as the political and eco-

threats and the national capabilities

rorism and cyber-warfare directed

nomic systems are doing. Examples

that will be required to respond to

against financial targets. … Oppo-

include the rise of challengers to the

them. With this in mind, I would like to

nents will be capable of what Marine

nation-state form (e.g., al-Qaeda and

offer a reconceptualization of the 2006

Lt. Gen. James Mattis has called

drug cartels), endemic state fail-

Quadrennial Defense Review, or QDR,

“hybrid wars.”1

ure, the European Union attempt at

threat categories by viewing these

Articulating such “combinational

Using this perceptual lens, we

creating a post-Westphalian regional

threat potentials through a modified

or hybrid threats” is an important

state, the rise of informational and

perceptual lens.

step forward in our understanding

bio-technical economies, mass mi-

of QDR threat categories, yet further

gration to the Internet (cyberspace)

are based on a four-square box that

reconceptualization is still warranted.

and increasing globalization.

has irregular challenges in the upper

I would suggest that a better way

As an outcome of this epochal

left-hand corner and, in a clockwise

of viewing these threat categories

transition — a revolution in political

fashion, catastrophic challenges,

is through a modified diagram that

and military affairs — the traditional

disruptive challenges and traditional

factors in each category (irregular,

challenges of the modern era are becom-

challenges listed in turn. The threats

catastrophic, disruptive and tradition-

ing less significant threats, even more

are shown migrating away from tradi-

al challenges) from the perspective of

so given the U.S. domination of conven-

tional challenges into the other three

threat level and time. Such additional

tional warfare. As we begin the transition

squares of the box. Specific areas of

modeling provides an iterated, rather

into the post-modern era — as one hu-

concern are the need to defeat ter-

than a static, perspective on national-

man civilization comes to an end and

rorist networks, prevent acquisition

security threats and allows us to

another begins — irregular challenges

or use of WMD, defend homeland in

gauge or measure their perceived level

become the greatest threat to U.S.

depth, and shape choices of countries

of severity. Such a visual reinterpre-

national-security interests.

at strategic crossroads. At the same

tation would include hybrid threats

time, the model recognizes that the

as an additional component to the

The current QDR threat categories

This transitional period is marked
by de-instutionalization, privitization

United States must “sustain

and outsourcing. Govern-

its capabilities to address

mental institutions are no

traditional challenges.”

longer able to contend with

Earlier thinking by Frank

changing times because of

Hoffman in Armed Forces Jour-

changes in all aspects of hu-

nal International also ques-

man civilization, including

tions the 2006 QDR threat

the technological, organiza-

modeling:

tional and legal realms. These

Rather than the simplistic

changes include the return to

quad chart found in the new

the battlefield, and probable

National Defense Strategy, fu-

ascendancy, of nonstate sol-

ture scenarios will more likely

diers — terrorists, insurgents,

present unique combinational

guerrillas, mercenaries and

or hybrid threats specifi-

private security contractors.

cally designed to target U.S.

Eventually, as this his-

vulnerabilities. Conventional,

torical process continues

irregular and catastrophic

through the coming decades
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artillery and cavalry) have a centuriesold history in the military arts. The
only difference with these threat mixes
is that they abstract things further
by mixing and matching nonmilitary
methods to military methods in “anything goes” combinations.
The utility of this reconceptualization of the 2006 QDR challenges model
is that it better defines and articulates
the national-security threats facing
the U.S. It allows the time and intensity of threat concerns to be visually
portrayed, views catastrophic threats
as an additive (or plus-up) capacity to
the other challenges, and takes into
consideration the mixing and matching of hybrid threats.
Ultimately, what this model sugand we begin to enter the post-mod-

using each challenge in a separate

ern era, disruptive challenges will

and discrete manner.

become the most significant threat to

Rather, in the threat mixes ad-

U.S. national-security interests. This

vocated in the well-known mainland

will come about as post-nation states

Chinese work Unrestricted Warfare,

re-instutionalize nonstate soldiers and

these challenges should be mixed and

their network structures, advanced

matched in such a way as to tailor

weaponry and concepts of operations

them to specific situations. A prime ex-

into their forces.

ample would be the layering of irregu-

Catastrophic challenges are an in-

lar and disruptive challenges, such as

teresting case, in that they should not

proxy terrorists’ use of directed-energy

be considered so much a stand-alone

weapons (the Chinese ZM-87 blind-

challenge as an additive threat (or

ing laser comes to mind) against U.S.

plus-up) to the traditional, irregular

civil-aviation assets as an asymmetric

and disruptive challenges that exist.

response to the future fielding of U.S.

For instance, terrorists with tactical

man-portable air-defense-systems

nuclear devices are a far greater threat

countermeasures.

to the U.S. than terrorists employing
conventional explosive devices.
Additionally, when viewing potential

Such “mixed-threat challenges”
have been discussed recently in an
article by retired Marine Lieuten-

foreign-state threats, such as those

ant Colonel F.G. Hoffman, who says,

from Beijing, while it is understood

“Our greatest challenge will not come

that a sequence of challenges will dom-

from a state that selects one approach

inate over time — first traditional (the

but from states or groups that select

past), second irregular (the present)

from the whole menu of tactics and

and third disruptive (the future), each

technologies to meet their own strate-

modified by catastrophic challenges (as

gic culture and geography.”2 None of

an additive threat) — this would not

this is all that new in the sense that

limit Beijing or any other state from

combined-arms approaches (infantry,

gests is that, while the U.S. is well-positioned to fight the modern wars of the
past against nation-states, it is now
required to field an epochal transitional capability to fight the irregular wars
of the present against nonstate threats,
while further keeping one eye to the
future, when it will be required to engage in the new “conventional” warfare
against post nation-state forms.
All might agree that we live in very
interesting times.

Notes:
1
Frank Hoffman, “How Marines are preparing
for hybrid wars,” Armed Forces Journal International, March 2006. Access at: http://www.afji.
com/2006/03/1813952.
2
Lieutenant Colonel F.G. Hoffman, USMCR (ret.),
“Preparing for Hybrid Wars,” Marine Corps Gazette,
March 2007, 57-61.
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